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THE BIRTH OF A PUBLIC CORPORATION 
Jon C. Teaford* 
PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER: THE CORPORATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW, 1730-1870. By Hen-
drik Hartog. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1983. 
Pp. xiv, 274. $27.50. 
One of the principal tenets of local government law, repeated in 
one treatise after another, is that a municipal corporation is a creature 
of the state, and barring any constitutional provisions to the contrary, 
state legislatures can adopt, amend, or repeal municipal charters at 
will. Unlike the business corporation, then, the municipal corporation 
is a public agent and a subordinate unit within the governing struc-
ture. By the late nineteenth century, virtually all lawyers, legislators, 
and judges accepted this as an unquestionable axiom of American law, 
a precept hallowed by frequent repetition in appellate court decisions. 
Yet the corporations governing Philadelphia and New York City were 
not always deemed public instrumentalities or pliant servants of state 
power. Instead, during the colonial era of American history, lawyers 
and judges regarded borough charters as inviolate grants of privilege 
and property not subject to the whim of legislative or royal authority. 
No distinction existed between public and private corporations; all 
corporations, whether boroughs or trading companies, enjoyed privi-
leges beyond the reach of the king, the Parliament, or the colonial 
assemblies. 
Thus, between the mid-1700's and mid-1800's the legal under-
standing of the municipal charter changed radically as corporations 
that had once enjoyed inviolate privileges became governing units of 
the state. In Public Property and Private Power: The Corporation of 
the City of New York in American Law, 1730-1870, Hendrik Hartog 
describes this transformation, focusing specifically on the nation's 
largest city. How did the concept of the modem municipal corpora-
tion develop? This is the question Hartog attempts to answer, and his 
volume is an excellent account of New York City's role in the birth of 
the public corporation. 
Hartog begins his history with New York City's Montgomerie 
Charter of 1730. Granted by Governor Montgomerie as representa-
tive of the Crown, this charter bestowed ample property on the corpo-
ration of the city of New York. It confirmed the corporation's 
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valuable East River ferry monopoly and its ownership of all the com-
mon and waste lands on Manhattan Island, both of these privileges 
originally having been granted in earlier charters. In addition, it be-
stowed on the corporation ownership of all submerged lands around 
the southern part of Manhattan Island up to four hundred feet beyond 
the low water mark. In other words, the city's corporation would con-
trol the construction of wharves, slips, and piers and could collect 
rents from anyone developing water lots for anchorage. This was a 
valuable concession, and it provided the city with a handsome income. 
Like other borough charters, however, the Montgomerie Charter did 
not grant the city council the right to levy direct taxes. The corpora-
tion was expected to rely instead on revenues from its extensive prop-
erty holdings. 
Hartog asserts that the corporation's chief day-to-day concern was 
the management of these properties (pp. 40-42). In making that claim, 
he explicitly challenges (pp. 37-40) the interpretation of colonial cities 
and boroughs that I presented in The Municipal Revolution in 
America: Origins of Modern Urban Government. 1 I concluded that 
prior to the mid-eighteenth century the principal business of borough 
corporations was the regulation and promotion of trade. But on the 
basis of his examination of the minutes of the New York City Com-
mon Council, Hartog believes otherwise. One entry after another in 
the council minutes deals with the disposition of the corporation's 
large estate. Consequently, Hartog concludes that the management of 
property, and not the regulation of trade and commerce, was viewed 
as the proper business of the corporation (p. 40). 
Hartog finds that the corporation's contracts granting the water 
lots conferred by the Montgomerie Charter were especially important 
to the city fathers. Previous historians have criticized New York's 
water-lot grants as corrupt deals serving the interests of a favored few, 
often the aldermen themselves.2 Hartog, however, believes that the 
corporation wisely exploited its submerged property, using the restric-
tive covenants in grant contracts to ensure the development of needed 
commercial facilities. The Common Council required grantees of 
water lots to build streets providing access to the waterfront and to 
construct wharves and slips according to certain specifications (pp. 50-
51). Thus, acting indirectly through grantees, the corporation pro-
vided for the commercial future of the growing seaport. 3 
The American Revolution disrupted this pattern of rule through 
1. J. TEAFORD, THE MUNICIPAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICA: ORIGINS OF MODERN URBAN 
GOVERNMENT 1650-1825 (1975). 
2. See, e.g., 2 G. EDWARDS, NEW YORK AS AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY MUNICIPALITY, 
1731-1776, at 150-51 (1917); Klein, Introduction, in THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 30 (M. 
Klein ed. 1963). 
3. See generally pp. 62-68. 
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property grants. In 1776 the British army occupied New York City, 
holding it until 1783. When the patriots resumed control at the close 
of the war, they found one quarter of the city gutted by fire and many 
of the docks and slips decaying after seven years of neglect. The cor-
poration needed money to restore these commercial facilities and bring 
renewed prosperity to the city. Yet in the minds of many lawmakers, 
the New York corporation and its royal charter were incompatible 
with the new republican order and not worthy objects of sympathy or 
support. In 1784 and 1785 the New York Council of Revision, a body 
that reviewed all state legislation, vetoed six bills put forward by the 
government of New York City and passed by the state legislature. Ac-
cording to this council, the legislature should not have approved new 
taxing powers for a corporation with a substantial estate that was not 
subject to the governing authority of state lawmakers but was instead 
derived from a royal grant (pp. 87-89).4 Moreover, post-revolutionary 
leaders questioned the structure of the corporation's government, for 
it did not accord with the republican doctrine of separation of powers 
(pp. 89-90). Altogether the city corporation was a relic of the past, a 
reminder of a discredited age when crown officials bestowed special 
privileges and lucrative properties on favored groups or localities. As 
such it was out of step with republican ideology, an alien presence 
within the new nation. 
As the notion of inviolate, privileged corporations fell into disfa-
vor, the city fathers gradually came to view their corporation as a unit 
of local government subordinate to the state legislature. Rather than 
emphasize the corporation's privileged status or demand additions to 
its vested estate, aldermen of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries recognized New York City's dependency and sent an in-
creasing number of petitions to the state legislature seeking permission 
to pave streets, levy taxes, or impose new regulations. Even when it 
seemed clear that the corporation already enjoyed the power to act, 
the Common Council often petitioned for state legislation confirming 
its authority.5 According to Hartog, these petitions testified to the al-
dermen's belief that the state legislature was now a more reliable 
source of authority than the royal charter (pp. 126-27). The royal 
charter was still valid, 6 but by the beginning of the nineteenth century 
4. The texts of all of the veto messages can be found in A. STREET, THE CoUNCIL OP REVI· 
SION OP THE STATE OP NEW YORK 251-52, 257-58, 261-64, 266-67, 273-74, 274-75 (1859). 
5. In the year 1802, for example, the Common Council asked its lawyer whether it had au-
thority to pass an ordinance regulating the lighting of fires in livery stables and on vessels lying in 
the harbor. The Council's lawyer, Richard Harison, opined that the Council did indeed possess 
the necessary power under the Charter, but nevertheless advised the members that they should 
obtain authorization from the state legislature as a precautionary measure. Pp. 127-28. 
6. The New York Constitution of 1777 continued the city's charter in force and explicitly 
protected it from direct legislative alteration. N.Y. CoNST. OP 1777, art. xxxvi. The state consti-
tution of 1821 reaffirmed this protection. N.Y. CoNST. OP 1821, art. 7, §xiv. 
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the corporation of New York City actually depended on the state leg-
islature for its authority to govern. 
This new reliance on state legislation, however, did not produce 
frequent conflicts between the city and the state. Instead, Hartog finds 
that state solons readily answered city prayers, giving the aldermen 
most anything they wanted (p. 132). The new wave of state legislation 
regarding the city was not a sign of growing state intervention in local 
government. Bills affecting New York City were usually framed by 
the Common Council and rubber stamped by state lawmakers. The 
state legislature did not enact scores of city measures because it lacked 
confidence in the corporation aldermen. Rather, the city aldermen 
lacked confidence in their own authority and asked lawmakers in the 
state capitol for a vote of approval. 
As the corporation gradually became a subordinate unit of govern-
ment, its property holdings diminished in importance. According to 
Hartog, a declining proportion of the entries in the Common Council 
minutes dealt with the sale, management, or supervision of the corpo-
rate estate (pp. 103-04), and New York's aldermen deviated from the 
pre-revolutionary practice of using the city's property to encourage 
lessees and grantees to construct needed public works and commercial 
facilities. 7 In the l 780's the corporation, still reeling from the damage 
and decay caused by the British occupation, agreed to sell a portion of 
its estate solely for the purpose of raising revenue. The corporation 
inserted no covenants or restrictions in the sale contracts, thus relin-
quishing its control over the development and use of the properties. 
Likewise, in 1796 the Council agreed to sell half of the city's common 
lands and lease the other half. Again no provisions governed the future 
of the property that had once belonged to the corporation. The city 
simply disposed of the real estate and demanded of the purchaser 
nothing but the sale price. The Common Council did continue its 
long-standing practices with regard to water-lot grants, requiring 
grantees to construct wharves and slips in accord with corporation 
specifications. But Hartog finds that by the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury the corporation's property was "no longer viewed . . . as a repos-
itory of government power" (p. 109). 8 
In fact, Hartog contends that by the second decade of the nine-
teenth century New York City had become a public entity approxi-
7. See pp. 103-10. 
8. Even with regard to the water-lot grants, Hartog observes that the appearance of con-
tinuity masks some important changes. For example, while water-lot grantees were still com-
pelled to undertake public works for the city, it became routine for the deeds to require only 
prospective street or wharf construction pending a later Common Council decision. Thus, the 
private act of granting a water lot would serve the private interests of the corporation and its 
grantees, and the public act of developing the property would await expression by the Common 
Council in its public, governmental capacity. Pp. 113-14. 
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mating the modern notion of a municipal corporation.9 As early as 
1806, receipts from corporate property amounted to only one-sixth of 
the city government's total operating expenditures, with taxes provid-
ing the bulk of the city's income (p. 144). Moreover, the city no longer 
relied so heavily on grant contracts with private parties to realize pub-
lic improvements. Instead, it assumed direct responsibility for con-
struction schemes, hiring two professional street commissioners "to 
take charge of the laying out, levelling, paving, and keeping in repair 
of the streets."10 Hartog finds that an incipient municipal bureaucracy 
was developing; the city eschewed its past reliance on public-spirited 
volunteers, hiring instead an army of scavengers to clean the streets 
and salaried personnel to manage the almshouse (pp. 130-33). The 
city government also exhibited a new concern for health and safety 
regulations and a willingness to shoulder a broader range of functions 
unrelated to the corporation's property holdings. 
Though Hartog believes that the corporation of New York City 
changed radically between 1775 and 1815, he does not end his study 
with the second decade of the nineteenth century. Instead, he devotes 
most of the remaining eighty-five pages of his book to describing the 
adaptation of legal theory and judicial doctrine to the corporation's 
new role. The practices and preoccupations of local governing bodies 
had changed by 1815, but during the following decades judges and 
commentators had to alter legal dogmas to fit the new reality. 11 The 
principles of Blackstone and other deceased legal luminaries would 
not suit the city governments of America. Now it was for the Ameri-
can common-law courts to fashion a new law of municipal 
corporations. 
One of the principal foundation stones of this new law was the 
United States Supreme Court's 1819 decision in Dartmouth College v. 
Woodward. 12 The opinions of both Chief Justice Marshall and Justice 
Story in Dartmouth College clearly recognized two distinct types of 
corporations, the private and the public. The Court held that state 
legislatures could not unilaterally tamper with charter privileges be-
stowed on private corporations. But, according to Justice Joseph 
Story's concurring opinion, a public corporation such as a city or town 
was one in which "the government [has] the sole right, as trustees of 
9. See p. 142. 
10. P. 132 (quoting 3 MINUTES OF THE CoMMON CoUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
1784-1831, at 123-24 (Sept. 6, 1802)). 
11. In his Introduction, Hartog confesses that when he undertook to write this book, he 
imagined that a study of New York City's legal history would reveal how the judicially formu-
lated law of municipal corporations came to change the governing assumptions of city govern-
ment. P. 6. Hartog's research correctly revealed, however, that the situation was quite the 
reverse: ''The law of municipal corporations cannot explain New York City's institutional trans-
formation, because that transformation occurred well before the creation of that law." P. 7. 
12. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). 
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the public interests, to regulate, control, and direct the corporation, 
and its funds and its franchises, at its owh good will and pleasure."13 
In eighteenth-century legal treatises the distinction between public and 
private corporations had not existed. Corporations were lay or ecclesi-
astical, eleemosynary or civil, and legal theorists classified both trad-
ing companies and boroughs under the same "lay, civil" rubric. By 
1819, however, the United States Supreme Court had sanctioned a 
new dichotomy in the American law of corporations, a dichotomy that 
protected business ventures from legislative interference but character-
ized municipal corporations as subordinate instruments of the state. 
Yet Dartmouth College did not answer all legal queries about the 
status of municipal corporations. The question of whether the munici-
pal corporation acted as a public arm of the state or as a private body 
achieved new significance in the 1840's and 1850's when courts sought 
to define the liability of cities in tort actions. If the municipal corpora-
tion was a wholly public entity, the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
freed it from the risk of civil liability. But if it retained some private 
attributes, then wronged parties might be able to collect damages from 
the city. In a series of tortured decisions, the courts held that when 
acting in certain capacities the city was a "private" body and liable, 
but in other circumstances it was a public agent and immune from 
suit. 14 When judges held municipal action to be private, however, 
they were not attempting to restore city corporations to their eigh-
teenth-century status (p. 240). According to Professor Hartog, by the 
1850's jurists never denied that the city was subordinate to the state 
legislature and an arm of state government (pp. 180-81, 206-07). 
In 1857 the New York Court of Appeals definitively upheld the 
idea of state supremacy in People ex rel. Wood v. Draper. 15 That year a. 
Republican-controlled legislature restructured the government of New 
York City without the consent of the Democratic mayor or of the 
Democratic Common Council.16 Mayor Fernando Wood challenged 
the legislature's action in the courts, but the state's highest tribunal 
rejected his arguments. According to Chief Justice Hiram Denio: "If 
we were to establish the principle that the legislature can never reduce 
the administrative authority of counties, cities or towns . . . we 
should, I think, make an impracticable government."17 Hartog cor-
13. P. 193 (quoting Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 671 (Story, J., concurring)). 
14. See, e.g., Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147 (1853) (financing of railroad was 
pursuant to a "public purpose" of the municipality); Lloyd v. Mayor of New York, 5 N.Y. 369 
(1851) (corporation of New York City has private "ministerial" duty not to leave open excava-
tions in streets); Bailey v. Mayor of New York, 3 Hill 531 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842), ajfd., 2 Denio 
433 (N.Y. 1845) (power to construct waterworks was granted to city as "private" franchise). 
15. 15 N.Y. 532 (1857). 
16. Among other measures, the administration of police, fire, and health agencies was re-
moved from local control, as was the management of the new Central Park. P. 237. 
17. Wood v. Draper, 15 N.Y. at 543. 
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rectly argues that Denio's opinion was not surprising. The Chief Jus-
tice was simply reiterating a principle of government that had taken 
root soon after the American Revolution and was firmly established by 
the 1850's. 
Yet some New York City officials clung to the belief that not all of 
the corporation's business was subject to state legislative control. Ac-
cording to Hartog, as late as the l 830's and l 840's many still believed 
that the "private" estate bestowed on the corporation of New York 
City by the Montgomerie Charter was an inviolate grant beyond the 
control of state lawmakers. Writing in 1836, the great legal commenta-
tor James Kent considered the city-owned ferry monopoly confirmed 
in the Montgomerie Charter to be "an absolute grant of vested prop-
erty, or an estate in fee, which could not lawfully be questioned or 
disturbed, except by due process of law."18 In Kent's opinion, this 
franchise was "as much beyond the reach of a gratuitous legislative 
resumption, as any other franchise or property held by grant or char-
ter."19 By the 1840's, however, Brooklyn residents who commuted 
daily to New York City on the corporation-owned ferry were ready to 
rebel against the inadequate service offered by the government of their 
sister city. In 1845 Brooklyn representatives successfully sponsored a 
bill in the New York state legislature that deprived New York City of 
its ferry monopoly. But five years later a judge of the New York 
Supreme Court ruled that the city's ferry franchise was indeed vested 
property beyond the reach of state lawmakers. In language reminis-
cent of Kent, he asserted that the city did retain some private rights in 
relation to the legislature.20 Later in the 1850's the Brooklyn Common 
Council renewed the struggle, initiating an appeal from this anachro-
nistic decision. And in 1860 the Court of Appeals ruled that the city's 
power to establish and maintain ferries was "a delegation of authority 
for public purposes, and not for private emolument."21 With this deci-
sion the courts laid to rest the last vestiges of the propertied pre-revo-
lutionary corporation. According to Hartog, "the corporation of the 
city of New York had become legally indistinguishable from property-
less institutions of derivative public administration" (p. 260). 
In his famous treatise on municipal corporations,22 published in 
1872, John F. Dillon bestowed his authoritative imprimatur on this 
new body of law that had developed since the Revolution. Genera-
tions of lawyers would repeat "Dillon's Rule," asserting that munici-
18. P. 240 (quoting J. KENT, THE CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, WITH NOTES 
THEREON. ALso, A TREATISE ON THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE MAYOR, ALDERMEN, 
AND AsslSTANT ALDERMEN, AND THE JOURNAL OF THE CITY CoNVENTION 140 (1836)). 
19. P. 240 (quoting J. KENT, supra note 18, at 141). 
20. Benson v. Mayor of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 245 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1850) (Barculo, J.). 
21. P. 257 (quoting People v. Mayor of New York, 32 Barb. 102, 120 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1860)). 
22. J. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS (1872). 
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palities possessed only those powers clearly and specifically granted by 
their respective state legislatures. City governments had no inherent 
powers; indeed, they could not exist without legislative authorization. 
The municipality was not a corporation with vested rights, but a pub-
lic entity whose every legitimate action was founded on revocable state 
legislation. Dillon recorded this as established truth, 23 and thereafter 
Dillon's word was law. 
Professor Hartog admirably recounts this long progression from 
Governor Montgomerie's charter to Dillon's Rule. It is a significant 
subject worthy of the 264 pages that Hartog devotes to it, and each of 
those pages testifies to the author's dogged research and perceptive 
intelligence. Hartog ably unearths the nuances of change buried be-
neath the convoluted verbiage of judicial opinions, and he likewise 
mines rich ore from the seemingly barren pages of common council 
minutes. He has diligently examined the pertinent sources and has 
constructed a well-reasoned argument on the firm foundation of his 
research. Moreover, his work is readable, a distinction that an in-
creasing number of scholarly studies do not share. A lay reader may 
slog through the fine points of water-lot grants and tort liability with 
some difficulty, but given his topic, Professor Hartog does a fine job of 
presenting his findings and expounding his arguments. Overall, Public 
Property and Private Power ranks among the better works published in 
the field of legal history during the past decade. 
Yet the reader should be warned of a few problems with Professor 
Hartog's admirable volume. For example, I would question Hartog's 
failure to recognize the pre-revolutionary symptoms of change in the 
legal status and function of New York City's corporation. The signifi-
cance of the corporation's estate was already declining as early as the 
1760's, as the Common Council turned with increasing frequency to 
the colonial assembly for authority to levy property taxes in support of 
public services. Between 1757 and 1775, the colonial legislature en-
acted twenty-three measures empowering the corporation to tax prop-
erty holders, and also periodically granted the city's aldermen the 
authority to expand or reorganize such local services as fire protection. 
In virtually every year after 1760 the corporation successfully applied 
to the legislature for permission to raise substantial sums through tax-
ation. For example, in 1770 New York's assembly authorized the 
Common Council to raise £1,600 through property levies for street 
lamps and payment of the city watch;24 that same year the city's water 
lots earned only £460, and even the lucrative ferries produced only 
23. See id. at 101-05. 
24. 5 COLONIAL LAWS OF NEW YORK, 1664-1775, at 53 (ch. 1425) (1894) (An Act to im-
power the Mayor Recorder and Aldermen of the City of New York, or the major Part of them to 
order the raising a Sum not exceeding sixteen Hundred pounds for the uses therein mentioned, 
passed, 1770). 
698 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 83:690 
£970. 25 Thus, even before the Revolution the corporation had ac-
quired the habit of applying to the legislature for privileges and pow-
ers, and even before the Revolution the corporation could not fulfill its 
responsibilities independently of the colonial assembly, simply by re-
course to its corporate property. The amount oflegislation concerning 
the corporation remained small compared to the flood of measures 
that would be passed during the nineteenth century, but already in the 
1760's and early 1770's the umbilical cord between the legislature and 
Common Council was firmly in place, and the corporation was being 
nourished by the public authority of the colony's lawmakers as well as 
by the private estate granted in the Montgomerie Charter. 
Hartog avoids dealing with this early evidence of the changing sta-
tus of New York City because it does not fit his emphasis on republi-
can ideology as the motive force in the corporation's transformation. 
According to Hartog, post-revolutionary ideology destroyed the privi-
leged, "private" position of the corporation.26 But if there are signs of 
change before the Revolution - and there are - this explanation will 
not suffice. Hartog needs to confront this problem and recognize that 
the American Revolution did not produce such an abrupt shift in the 
history of the corporation as he implies. 
I also disagree with Hartog's contention that his interpretation of 
the colonial corporation sharply contradicts the views I presented in 
The Municipal Revolution in America.21 I argued that the regulation 
and promotion of trade were the chief concerns of most borough cor-
porations prior to the mid-eighteenth century; Hartog contends that 
the management of New York's property holdings preoccupied the 
corporation aldermen. Yet as Hartog himself so ably documents, the 
corporation used its property holdings, most notably its water lots, to 
promote and regulate the construction of wharves, docks, slips, and 
other facilities vital to the city's seagoing commerce. The corporation 
did not use its property holdings to encourage the creation of parks, 
hospitals, or water-supply systems. Instead, in the early eighteenth 
century the development of trade was of preeminent concern. Thus, 
the gap between Hartog's findings and my own work is not as great as 
he seems to contend. The difference is that Hartog offers an excellent 
account of the means employed to develop commerce, a matter that I 
glossed over quickly. When Hartog writes that the "property rights of 
the Montgomerie Charter were granted in pursuit of the goal of creat-
ing a major seaport in New York City" (p. 34), he in fact accords 
closely with my position.28 
25. G. EDWARDS, supra note 2, at 197. 
26. "Corporate property was . . . identified both with the much-contested and much-de-
tested rights of the great land magnates of the state and with a special privilege that was anath-
ema in a republican revolutionary culture." P. 85. 
27. See text at note 1 supra. 
28. See J. TEAFORD, supra note 1, at 17. 
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Finally, readers of Public Property and Private Power need to be 
warned and reminded that this is a study of but a single corporation, 
and one can generalize from Hartog's findings only at one's own peril. 
Hartog correctly observes that before the nineteenth century there was 
no general law of municipal corporations. Each corporation operated 
under a unique charter and there was no standard set of borough of-
ficers or borough privileges (pp. 22-23). The uniqueness of the New 
York City corporation limits the significance of Hartog's work, in that 
while real property in the form of water lots and common lands may 
have played an important role in the history of New York City's colo-
nial corporation, this was not the case in other colonial boroughs. Of 
the other borough corporations in the thirteen British colonies, only 
Albany enjoyed extensive real property holdings like those of New 
York City. Other charters vested corporations with money-making 
privileges, but they were rarely as lucrative as the New York proper-
ties. And since other boroughs enjoyed fewer privileges, they could 
not act as effectively as New York City in planning the commercial 
development of the community. Among the most common privileges 
granted borough corporations was the right to rent market stalls and 
collect fees from those participating in borough fairs. Like New York 
City's water lots, these were vested charter privileges that allowed the 
corporations to reap revenues without resorting to direct taxes. But 
with its ferry franchise, water lots, and common lands, in addition to 
market stalls, New York City was much richer than virtually all of the 
other colonial boroughs. 
Not only was New York City's corporation unusual during the co-
lonial period, it was virtually unique following the Revolution. Unlike 
most other borough charters in the thirteen colonies, the charters of 
New York City and Albany survived the Revolution unimpaired. In 
fact, New York's charters were specifically confirmed by the state con-
stitutions of 1777 and 1821.29 Since New York City clung to its colo-
nial charter long after other cities had discarded their antique 
instruments of rule, the corporate development of New York City in 
the nineteenth century is atypical and somewhat anachronistic. For 
example, New York City's stand in the battle over the ferry monopoly 
in the l 850's was more representative of the legal doctrines of the 
eighteenth century than those of the nineteenth. Nowhere other than 
in New York would judges seriously entertain claims that certain mu-
nicipal charter privileges were vested rights beyond state control. 
While Professor Hartog surely recognizes the anachronistic nature of 
this dispute, 30 the reader needs to be reminded of the peculiarity of 
29. See note 6 supra. 
30. Hartog readily concedes that "[t]he separation of government from corporation that 
characterized eighteenth-century Philadelphia occurred much later in New York City," and thus 
he seeks to reformulate his broader goal as follows: 
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New York City's corporate development. It should be emphasized 
that New York City's ferry claims represented the last gasp of the old 
order. Gotham may have been in the vanguard of the nation's com-
merical development, but it was in the rearguard of its legal evolution. 
Because of his narrow focus on New York City, Professor Hartog 
may, in fact, mislead the reader. Hartog emphasizes that in the 1820's 
and 1830's New York City was not yet just another standardized unit 
in a sytem of public administration imposed by the state (pp. 180-82). 
It still enjoyed an individuality and distinctiveness conferred upon it 
by the Montgomerie Charter of 1730. Hartog's views may be correct 
with regard to New York City, but elsewhere in the nation early nine-
teenth-century legislators were mass-producing borough or town cor-
porations that did not enjoy any special privileges vis-a-vis the state. 
Outside of New York the notion of the municipal corporation simply 
as a unit of government, like the county or township, was well devel-
oped. For example, in post-revolutionary Pennsylvania a borough 
charter was no longer a privilege but a right bestowed on virtually any 
community desiring one. Moreover, there was a cookie-cutter consis-
tency to the borough charters; lawmakers employed a standard form 
so that the charter of Chambersburg differed little from that of Green-
castle or Connellsville. Pennsylvania's lawmakers sometimes tired of 
reprinting the same provisions for each borough, and occasionally they 
specified that the charter of one borough would also apply to another. 
Thus, in 1806 the abbreviated charter of Bellefonte simply provided 
that the inhabitants and borough officers would "be in all things gov-
erned by similar rules and regulations as are granted to and provided 
for the inhabitants and borough officers of the borough of Williams-
port, . . . by an act of Assembly, passed in the present Session of the 
Legislature. "31 
The passage of general incorporation acts for boroughs and towns 
was also indicative of the new status of the municipal corporation. In 
1817 the Indiana legislature was overwhelmed by "the number of ap-
plications . . . from the inhabitants of different towns in this state, to 
become incorporated."32 Because "the granting of charters to each 
would be productive of much loss of time to this General Assem-
bly,"33 the legislature enacted a standard charter which any locality 
The issue is not the marginal differences between Philadelphia and New York City but 
how to characterize corporate government in eighteenth·century America. Was New York 
City "a regime of little government" like . .. . Philadelphia, or was it a regime whose gov-
ernment can only be understood if we put aside our conventional expectations about the 
nature of a public sphere? 
P. 37. 
31. Act to Erect the Town of Bellefonte, in Centre County, into a Borough, ch. 184, § 1, 
1806 Pa. Laws 615, 616. 
32. Act Providing for the Incorporation of Towns in the State oflndiana, ch. 81, preamble, 
1817 Ind. Laws, 2d Sess. 373, 373. 
33. 1817 Ind. Laws, 2d Sess. 373, 373. 
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could adopt if two-thirds of the qualified voters in the community ap-
proved. Following the election, the town had only to deposit a certifi-
cate of incorporation with the county clerk, and it would be an 
incorporated body.34 That same year the state of Ohio adopted a simi-
lar measure, as did Missouri in 1825.35 Most communities still sought 
a charter directly from the state legislature, but the general incorpora-
tion laws reflected the changing attitudes toward the municipal corpo-
ration. As early as 1817 state lawmakers were framing charters that 
were universally applicable to any borough or town in the state. Bor-
ough charters were no longer special grants of sovereign favor; they 
were statutes describing the responsibilities and framework of a stan-
dard unit of state government. Even before Dartmouth College the old 
notion of the corporation had been discarded. 
Hartog's study is, then, a fine account of the corporation of New 
York City. But it is not an account of the origin of the modern munic-
ipal corporation in the United States. New York City was an unusual 
case both before and after the Revolution. Anyone seeking to under-
stand the development of the modern municipal corporation as a gov-
ernmental unit should recognize the limitations of Public Property and 
Private Power. Yet those interested in the local history of New York 
City and the evolution of its government will find Hartog's volume 
richly rewarding. 
34. Act Providing for Incorporation, ch. 81, §§ 2-5, 1817 Ind. Laws, 2d Sess. 373, 373-75. 
35. Act to Provide for the Incorporation of Towns, ch. xxxiii, 1816 Ohio Laws 74; Act to 
Provide for the Incorporation of Towns, 1825 Mo. Laws 764. 
